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ABSTRACT
In this thesis the author discusses generally the
theory of making decisions using statistical methods, i.e.,
statistical decision theory. He then proceeds to build a
model in which he applies this statistical decision theory
to the specific application of making legal decisions.
After the model is discussed and illustrated with
a theoretical legal decision the author, through exhaustive
interviews with members of the legal profession, presents
an actual law case which he analyzes in accordance with his
theoretical model.
In a chapter entitled "The Problems" the author
explains the difficulties in applying a scientific theory to
analyze a real world situation. He also explains his ap-
proach in overcoming the inherent difficulties present when
one tries to obtain scientific data to be used in a scienti-
fic model from an unscientific source (the attorney).
The basic gain to the attorney in using the tech-
niques of this thesis is that he can evaluate the usefulness
of any method he may wish to employ to increase his knowl-
edge of the "unknown factors" which are hindering his deci-
sion making ability. By application of a Bayesian analysis
of the statistical data based on the past experiences of the
attorney, the statistical effect of any above-mentioned meth-
od is calculated.
-2-
This thesis is applied only to very simple de-
cisions here, but its extension to more complex legal de-
cisions with the use of computors is also discussed.
Thesis Supervisor: Ronald A. Howard
Title: Associate Professor of Electrical Engineering
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APPLICATION OF STATISTICAL DECISION
THEORY TO LEGAL DECISIONS
INTRODUCTION
Decision making may assume all shapes and dimen-
sions. It may be the smallest of everyday decisions that
are made, usually without much thought of process or conse-
quence, or it may be the decision of the President of the
United States which is made with careful thought both to the
information inputs and the consequences of the action chosen.
The latter type of decision more visually points up the use
of a systematic process in decision making, whereas the for-
mer may not be worth the trouble to systematize. However,
before you can decide which decisions are worth systematic
analysis you must have some framework in which you can com-
pare various decisions. Such a framework is the theory of
statistical decision making.
Statistical Decision Theory, based upon the work of
Wald after the last World War, created an object of attention
for a wide class of mathematicians, philosophers and scien-
tists, and led to a. general revamping of the then current ap-
proaches to decision problems.
Statistical decision theory is concerned with the
mathematical analysis of decision making when the "state of
nature" is unknown but further knowledge about the true "state
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of nature" may be obtained through experimentation, possibly
at a cost. The object of statistical decision theory is to
choose a course of action, which may or may not attempt to
improve our knowledge of the true "state of nature", which
is consistent in some way with the decision maker's own per-
sonal preferences, as expressed through his utility curves
and which is also consistent with what weight he assigns the
possible "states of nature", as expressed by numerical prob-
abilities.
In applying statistical decision theory, we real-
ize that if the true "state of nature" is known with absolute
certainty, then our decision making becomes trivial, and
therefore, any meaningful decision process will be statisti-
cal in nature. In addition to these probabilistic consider-
ations in decision making, one also relies on what is usually
called experience. This is nothing more than using the les-
sons of the past to help in making present decisions. Some
fields in which decisions are to be made lend more readily to
using past experience or precedence. Legal decisions are of
such a nature.
In this thesis we will investigate the application
of statistical decision theory to making legal decisions.
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CHAPTER I
THE THEORY
The obvious questions at this point are: just what
constitutes statistical decision theory and how in the world
can it be applied to so vague and sacrosanct a thing as a law-
yer's decision making process in making legal decisions for
his client? First of all, statistical decision theory is the
analysis of the high art of making decisions in the face of
an uncertain world in which further information about the un-
certain world can be obtained. Further, it is the mathemati-
cal analysis utilizing the techniques of statistics and the
concepts of probability theory.
Functionally the decision maker must choose a par-
ticular course of action to follow, such a course of action
is to be chosen from amongst a group of potential courses of
action that he could follow. Therefore, on the surface, it
appears that the decision maker must choose the particular
course of action that will be the best for him in some sense.
Now, this would not be a problem if the "state of the world"
were known with absolute certainty, because the decision mak-
er, with a prescribed "goal" (e.g., making money) in mind,
would simply peruse the possible courses of action and pick
that course of action which would best (e.g., give him the
most money) lead him to his "goal". Symbolically, we refer
to a particular course of action by the symbol Ai (the ith
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course of action of those available) and we refer to a partic-
ular "state of nature" by the symbol 9j (the ith "state of na-
ture" of those possible). However, the exact "state of nature"
is not known with absolute certainty and therein lies the rub.
The possible "states of nature" can then be considered as com-
prising a sample space (i.e., any collection of events related
in some way) and a probability measure can be defined over this
sample space. In other words, instead of saying that "the
'state of nature' is such and such", we say that "the 'state of
nature' has a probability of being such and such." In symbols
we refer to the probability of the state of nature being, say,
9 is Pr i). Ideally, we would like Pr(9 i) to be 1 for a
particular state of nature and 0 for all the others. (See Ap-
pendix for some elementary probability theory to be used in
this text.) This, of course, corresponds to knowing the exact
"state of nature" with absolute certainty and therefore would
correspond to perfect decision making with respect to an uncer-
tain "state of nature".
Now the question arises, if it is so advisable to
know what is the exact "state of nature'' with as much certain-
ty as possible, i.e., having a sample space which has one par-
ticular "state of nature" with a probability most nearly 1, and
others with a probability most nearly 0, then how can we alter
the situation where we are not at all sure what the exact
"state of nature" is; i.e., a sample space with no one par-
ticular state of nature having a higher P(91) than any of the
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others. The answer is that we can change our knowledge about
what is the true "state of nature" by gaining additional in-
formation through experimentation. In other words, we perform
an experiment which has one of many outcomes and based on each
of these outcomes, we have a new probability measure defined
on our sample space (one probability measure for each possible
experimental outcome). Symbolically, we refer to the possible
outcomes of our experiment e, by Zi. We refer to the probabil-
ities of the possible states of nature before we perform the
experiment, P(G), as the a-prior probabilities, and we refer
to the new probabilities of the possible states of nature af-
ter we experiment, P(91/Zi), as the a-posteriori probabilities.
Note that the probabilities of the possible states of nature
after the experiment is performed are conditional probabili-
ties, conditioned on the outcome of the experiment chosen.
For those readers who may be familiar with the science
of statistical communications and more specifically with the
work of Prof. C.E. Shannon and his information theory, I would
like to point out the analogy between the above process of in-
creasing one's knowledge of the true "state of nature" through
experimentation, thus changing the a-priori probabilities P(O)
into the a-posteriori probabilities P(9i/Zl) on the "states of
nature" sample space, and the process of changing the a-priori
probability of a message sample space into the a-posteriori
probabilities by transmitting the signal over a noisy trans-
mission path and making a reception. In the latter case we
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are increasing one's knowledge about which one of a set of
signals was sent on a noisy path by making a reception;
therefore, the a-posteriori probabilities of which signal
was sent is also a conditioned probability, and it is con-
ditioned on what was received.
So we can see that in the statistical communica-
tion case the message space is analogous to the "states of
nature" space and which message was picked from this space
is analogous to the exact "state of nature". The experiment
is transmitting the message which was picked and receiving
a signal. Now based upon the received signal (the outcome
of the experiment), we can better say which message was
picked (i.e., better say what is the exact "state of nature").
This completes our analogy.
Let us now complete the decision making framework
by examining that aspect of it which differentiates it from
the above analogous communication process. I am referring
to the concept of utility.
Utility used in this text means the usefulness (or
lack of usefulness with respect to a 0 utility level) of a
combination of circumstances. It is the "payoff" for play-
ing the game of decision making, and it also includes the
costs or fees involved in playing the game.
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Once the decision maker has chosen a particular ex-
periment to perform in order that he may better judge what the
exact state of nature is he now has a list of all the possible
outcomes of this experiment. He then, according to his own
preferences, assigns a utility (a gain or loss to him of some
definite or indefinite quantity) to observing one of the pos-
sible outcomes Zi of the chosen experiment and thereupon tak-
ing a particular course of action ai. Of course we realize
that the price of the experiment chosen could conceivably de-
pend on the outcome Zi.
We have heretofore considered two types of probabil-
ity measures and both have been defined on what we have re-
ferred to as the "state of nature" sample space. These are
the a-priori probabilities P(91 ) and the a-posteriori proba-
bilities P(91/Zi) which are conditioned on one of a set of
possible outcomes of our chosen experiment. However, these
outcomes Zi are also events and as such they also make up a
sample space (let us refer to this sample space as the "exper-
iment-outcomes" sample space). Therefore, as in the states
of nature sample space, we may assign a probability P(Zi),
i.e., the probability of a certain outcome of the chosen ex-
periment before the exact state of nature is known (an a-pri-
ori probability) and we may assign a probability P(Zi/9i),
i.e., the probability of a certain outcome of the chosen ex-
periment given that the exact state of nature is 9i (an a-pos-
teriori probability conditioned on the exact state of nature).
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All four of these probabilities, P(9), P(9/Zi), P(Zi) and
P(Zi/9i) are related as explained in Appendix by the Bay-
sian relationship:
P(9i) P(Zi/91) = P(Zi) P(9i/Zi) = P(Zi,9Q)
where P(Zi,9j) is the probability of the joint event that
when you perform the chosen experiment that the outcome will
be Zi, and that the exact state of nature would be 9i.
(P(Zi,9) is thus a joint probability.)
Let us now consider how we assess the above proba-
bilities. P(91), which is the a-priori probability of the
existing state of nature., is a very objective guess as to
what is the present state of nature before you have performed
an experiment to aid you; it is your best guess.
P(Zi), which is the probability that the outcome of
a given experiment will be Zi before the exact state of na-
ture is known, may be exceedingly difficult to estimate and
will have to be computed from the joint P(91,Zi), or based on
extensive experience data. The probability P(Zi/Q), which is
the probability that the experiment will have an outcome Zi
when the state of nature is known to be 9i when the experiment
is performed, is an estimate sometimes based on intuition but
also based on experience data which lists what the outcome of
the experiment is when the state of nature is known to be 91.
Then we may associate the relative frequency of the number of
outcomes which are Zi with the P(Zi/9Q).
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P(9i/Zi), which is the a-posteriori probability
of the existing state of nature after you have experimented,
can be calculated from the above-mentioned Baysian relation-
ship when you know P(9G) ; P(Zi/Q) and you have calculated
P(Zi)
i.e.,
P(91/zi) P(Zi/Oi) POi
P(Zi)
With the above general description of the various
aspects of statistical decision theory in mind we may look
at the decision making process as a game. The two protagon-
ists are the decision maker and nature (or the unknown ele-
ments). The game is played thusly: first, the decision ma-
ker defines the possible courses of action available to him,
he gives his a-priori probabilities as to what is the exact
state of nature and he performs an experiment of his choice
(which may be not to experiment at all). Then it is nature's
turn to go. It chooses an outcome to the experiment, say Zi
according to the probability P(Zi). Next the decision maker
takes the spotlight. He chooses a course of action ai, which
in general will depend on what nature chooses as the outcome
Zi. The next move is up to nature, who chooses a state of
nature 9i according to the probability P(9G/Zi), the a-pos-
teriori probability conditioned.
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The game is now completed, and now the decision
maker will receive his "payoff" or the utility he will re-
ceive for performing the experiment and getting the outcome
Zi, taking the action ai with the exact state of nature be-
ing 9i.
The game or decision making procedure may be char-
acterized by a decision tree such as tnat shown in Fig. 1.
Here we have the nodes of the tree as the points in the proc-
ess where decisions have to be made. The convention that I
will be using is to represent decision nodes at which the de-
cision maker must decide by an X and to represent decision
nodes at which nature must decide by a dot (.).
The branches flowing out of a nature decision node
are chosen by nature statistically and these statistics are
entered below the corresponding branch. The terminal utili-
ties from a utility table are entered after the terminal
nodes of our decision tree and the expected utilities are en-
tered above the node corresponding to nature's decision and
the expected utility due to the decision maker's decision (which
will be oriented to maximize the expected utility) is placed
above that corresponding node.
Let us now proceed to look at some of the problems
involved in applying the above theory to making legal deci-
sions.
-15-
F IG 0
a-?
a2)
2)
e2-)
CHAPTER II
THE PROBLEMS
In the previous chapter we discussed the theory of
making decisions utilizing a statistical approach. Well, the
problem that is under investigation here is whether or not
this statistical decision theory is applicable to making the
decisions that arise in the legal profession. As is the case
with most investigations of this type the major problem arises
in trying to fit a precise and mathematically-defined model,
like the one presented in Chapter I, to the harsh realities of
the real world. You must be able to associate the proper areas
of the real world with the various defined segments of your
model.
The procedure that I employed in this thesis is that
I interviewed a number of well-reputed attorneys and explained
to them what statistical decision theory was, and that I was
trying to find some application of this theory to making legal
decisions. I then asked them if they would look into their
files and come up with some cases in which they thought this
theory might apply. We then proceeded to analyze these cases
where the attorneys attempted to educate me as to the law and
facts involved.
We then selected a few cases which I thought would
be especially illustrative for this investigation. I then
proceeded to inquire as to what were the attorney's decisions
in each of these cases. What alternatives did the attorney see
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open to him? What were the unknown factors involved that the
attorney had to consider before choosing amongst these sever-
al alternatives? Here we drew the analogy between the alter-
natives of the real world situation and the courses of action
ai of the model. The problem here is that any complex legal
decision will usually have a large number of alternatives open
to the attorney which, in the face of a large number of states
of nature, could lead to a very extensive decision tree, and
thus may need a computer to calculate and keep track of all the
probabilistic data. Therefore, to keep the calculation within
bounds and to provide a better illustrative example, I had to
restrict the number of possible courses of action, and in the
law case that was finally selected for illustration of this
investigation we have only two possible alternatives from which
the attorney is to make his decision.
The unknown factors of the real world, mentioned above,
are analogous to the states of nature 9i in our model. The
problem here is again that for a very large number of states of
nature, the decision tree becomes very complex and more complex
computational means must be employed. In addition, I have dis-
covered that a large number of legal decisions must be made in
the face of a continuous distribution of states of nature as
compared with discrete states of nature as illustrated in this
thesis. A continuous distribution of states of nature needs
continuous probability theory to describe its statistics and my
suggestions on this topic are presented in Chapter V of this text.
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Once we have determined what in the real world we
are to call the courses of action ai and wnat we are to call
the states of nature, we need to know the attorney's a-priori
probability of the states of nature; i.e., his degree of un-
certainty. The problem here is that most attorneys are un-
certain about what they are uncertain about. In short, it may
be almost impossible to get an attorney to give you the
a-priori probabilities.
Also, at this point, in addition to the statistics
on the states of nature, we need to ascertain from the attor-
ney just what he expects to gain or lose in terms of utility
expressed in relative units when he takes a course of action
and finds a state of nature. This information is his utility
table discussed in the preceding chapter, and it has as its
counterpart in the real world how the attorney feels he has
gained or lost either monetarily or in any other way when he
decides on a particular alternative and later finds out the
true factors involved. In interviewing these attorneys, I
have found it very difficult to obtain these utility tables,
and I believe the reason is that an attorney is simply not
used to the idea of thinking in terms of utilities. Or, at
least, he does so only subconsciously. When the states of
nature are continuous, then the utilities are no longer dis-
crete entries into a table, but are now a function of the
continuous variable 9 and have ai as a parameter. Thus the
expected utility is no longer a weighted sum but it is an
integral.
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The next problem that arises in applying statisti-
cal decision theory to legal decision is choosing the proper
experiment to investigate. The experiment to increase one's
knowledge at a price of the state of nature usually does not
come to the attorney's door. The mountain must go to Moham-
med, and therein is the problem. If good experiments, and I
mean good in the sense of raising the expected utilities by
more than it costs, are to be found and analyzed as good,
they must be suggested by someone, and since an attorney's
time and knowledge are his product, it may turn out to be too
expensive to analyze all possiDle experiments in search of
the good ones. A further discussion of the need for a cri-
teria to limit the number of experiments that are worth in-
vestigating is presented in Chapter V.
Once an experiment is under analysis, we must ob-
tain from the attorney his estimates of the P(Zi/9j) or in
words, the probability that the experiment will have an out-
come Zi if it is known beforehand that the state of nature is
9j. This is usually gotten from historical background of the
experiment. The problem arises when this historical data is
unavailable.
With the above problems in mind let us now analyze
a theoretical case in which we apply the statistical decision
theory to making a hypothetical legal decision.
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CHAPTER III
A THEORETICAL EXAMPLE
With the foregoing concepts in mind, let us now
consider a theoretical situation that a typical lawyer might
have to encounter. The facts of this case are purely ficti-
tious but the methods used here would be the same as the meth-
ods used to apply statistical decision theory in an actual
law case. In subsequent chapters we will analyze actual law
cases and see how well the theoretical application of this
chapter holds for the practical world of the practicing at-
torney.
In this theoretical example we will analyze the
facts of the case and determine what the possible states of
nature are. Then we will consider what are the possible
courses of action open to our friend the attorney, and for
each action we will determine the utility gained or lost by
the attorney in light of a particular prevailing state of
nature. We then determine the a-priori probabilities and
the a-posteriori probabilities of which is the prevailing
state of nature. We can then plan our strategies; i.e.,
our course of action given a particular outcome of our ex-
periment and calculate the expected utility for each of
these strategies. Then, based on these statistics, we will
decide on the best strategy leading to the maximum utility.
The facts of this case are as follows. A young
man, age 23, came into the State Street office of the
-21-
world-renowned criminal attorney, the famous Mr. Justice. The
young man sat down in front of Mr. Justice's huge mahogany
desk and proceeded to speak, "I need your help Mr. Justice.
My name is Arnold Friend and I am here to ask you to defend
my best buddy who is now in county jail awaiting trial. His
name is John Trouble and he is being charged with the murder
of Bill Bullet who was found shot to death in his Back-bay
apartment."
The first decision that our famous lawyer has to
face is whether to handle this case or not. Let us call these
two available courses of action a, to defend Mr. Trouble, and
a2 not to defend Mr. Trouble. Now, before Mr. Justice has had
a chance to do any investigation into the facts of the case,
he knows that either Mr. Trouble is guilty or he is innocent,
and since Mr. Justice has no further information than the name
of the visitor and the name of the accused, he arbitrarily as-
signs equal probabilities to these states of nature. In other
words, the two states of nature are 91, Mr. Trouble is inno-
cent of the crime, or 92, Mr. Trouble is guilty of the crime.
Mr. Justice then thinks to himself, "If I defend
Mr. Trouble (a,) and he is really innocent (91), then I have
a good chance to further my career, and I'll earn some money
to boot." This seems like the best situation for Mr. Justice
and he arbitrarily assigns it a gain of 3 units. This is an
arbitrary assignment and it is customary to assign a maximum
gain of utility to the best combination of 9i and ai and then
any other combination (which would be less favorable to Mr.
-22-
Justice) would have a gain, less than the maximum, assigned
to that 0 and ai. "So", thinks Mr. Justice, "if I do not de-
fend Mr. Trouble (a2) and he is really innocent (91) then I
am not doing my part for justice and also I will not receive
a salary. However, my reputation cannot be harmed very much;
I think I would gain 1 unit relative to the situation of
(a19 ) above." Considering the other possibilities, he de-
cides that if he does not defend Mr. Trouble (a2) and Mr.
Trouble is really guilty (02) then his prestige will gain and
he gives this gain an assignment of 2 units. Finally, if he
does defend Mr. Trouble (a,) and Mr. Trouble is guilty (2),
then his reputation will suffer greatly and his gain is 0
units on the relative scale. Mr. Justice's utilities are
summarized in Table I.
After mentally calculating his utility table 1, Mr.
Justice whipped out a piece of paper and a pencil and drew
the decision tree illustrated in Fig. 2. In this tree our
decision making lawyer denotes nodes at which he is faced
with a decision by an X and he denotes those nodes where nature
makes her decision by a dot (.). The branches of the tree
extending from a nature decision node have a symbol above the
branch representing which choice that branch corresponds to,
and below each branch is the probability with which nature
chooses that branch. At the tip of each branch is placed the
utility corresponding to traveling that far along the decision
tree and next to the nature node is placed the expected utility
-23-
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for taking the course of action which leads to that nature
decision node. Our decision maker, Mr. Justice, will de-
cide on that course of action which will maximize his ex-
pected gain.
In this case, with his limited information, Mr.
Justice calculates that if he chooses to defend Mr. Trouble,
that Mr. Trouble will be innocent with a probability .5 and
this will yield a gain of 3 and that Mr. Trouble will be
guilty with a probability .5 and this will yield a gain of 0.
Therefore, the expected gain for Mr. Justice by taking action
a is (.5)(3) + (.5)(0) = 1.5. On the other hand, if he de-
cides not to defend Mr. Trouble (a2), then Mr. Trouble will
be innocent (91) with a probability .5 and this will yield a
gain of 1 and that Mr. Trouble will be guilty (92) with a prob-
ability .5 and this will yield a gain of 2. Therefore, Mr.
Justice calculates that by taking action a2 his expected loss
is (.5)(1) + (.5)(2) = 1.5.
In this case the expected gain for each course of
action a1 or a2 is the same and it does not matter which course
of action Mr. Justice takes to maximize his expected gain. Even
though this is a theoretical example, it is still a model of a
true life situation, and as such, the utility table should re-
flect the true bias of the decision maker. In this case of
equal probable P(91), the decision maker is unbiased as to
which course of action to choose. We can then say that Mr.
Justice is unbiased as to the exact state of nature. However,
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consider what a table such as Table la might reflect as to
Mr. Justice's bias. In this table la only the entry for
(a1  2) is changed and it is decreased from 0 to -1; i.e.,
Mr. Justice is now more sensitive to a loss of reputation
(maybe this is an election year and Mr. Justice is running
for D.A.). The decision tree now takes on the shape of
Fig. 2a, and mirroring the above calculation, Mr. Justice
calculates that his expected gain of utility for taking ac-
tion a1 is 1, and for taking action a2 is still 1.5. Now,
Mr. Justice is advised to select action a2 to maximize his
expected gain. We can now say that Table la reflects a2 '
And similar analyses changing other entries in Table I might
lead to choosing action a1 with equal P(91 ) and thus reflect
a decision maker biased toward action a1 .
Using Table 1 as Mr. Justice's utilities, we found
that it made no difference to him which action he chose with
regard to maximizing his expected gain.
However, the assumed P(91) being equal-probable
represents the fact that, as astute as Mr. Justice may be,
he has absolutely no knowledge as to whether Mr. Trouble is
guilty or innocent. Of course, since Mr. Justice is so as-
tute, he now considers the possibilities of obtaining more
information about the guilt or innocence of Mr. Trouble by
paying a price. In other words, through experimentation
(at a cost), Mr. Justice hopes to improve his knowledge of
the true state of nature and then by choosing an appropriate
-27-
course of action, maximize the expected gain in utility still
further. Before we consider the introduction of an experi-
ment, let us ponder the value to Mr. Justice of information
which would tell him exactly what the prevailing state of
nature is. For example, if he were told that Mr. Trouble is
innocent, he would defend him for a gain of 3. If he were
told that Mr. Trouble were guilty, then he would not defend
him for a gain of 2. At this point in the game, Mr. Justice
would be told this perfect information with the a-priori
probabilities. In other words, he would be told that Mr.
Trouble was innocent with a probability of .5 and he would
be told that Mr. Trouble was guilty with a probability of .5.
Therefore, if Mr. Justice were given this perfect information
he would expect a gain of .5(3) + .5 (2) = 2.5. Before he
had this perfect information he could take either action a1
or a2 and expect a gain of 1.5. The perfect information
represents a gain to Mr. Justice of 1 unit and he should be
willing to pay any price up to 1 unit for it. Also, since
any experiment he can hope to perform to obtain a better
knowledge of the state of nature can give him only informa-
tion inferior to the perfect information, 1 unit represents
a maximum he should be willing to expend for any experiment.
With this in mind, Mr. Justice considers making
use of his life-long friend, the eminent private investiga-
tor Mr. Holmes. He has used Mr. Holmes in the past and he
knows that Mr. Holmes will charge him an amount which, meas-
ured in utility, will be .5 units. For this sum Mr. Holmes
-28-
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will make an investigation of the case and will report back
to Mr. Justice one of three reports. These three possible
reports we will call Zi, Z2 and Z3 - Zl represents the re-
port that Mr. Trouble is "very guilty" Z2 represents the
report that Mr. Holmes does not know whether Mr. Trouble is
guilty or not even after the investigation. Finally, Z3
represents the report that Mr. Trouble is "very innocent".
Using the same notation as above we draw the de-
cision three illustrated in Fig. 3. The first decision that
Mr. Justice must now make is whether to have Mr. Holmes in-
vestigate (represented by el) or to make a decision without
any further information (represented by eo). If Mr. Justice
decides not to have an investigation, then the decision tree
branching off of eo will be the same as Fig. 2. If, however,
Mr. Justice decides to make use of Mr. Holmes' services, he
will decide e . The next decision will be nature's and she
will decide on one of the three reports Zl, Z2 , Z3 with cor-
responding probabilities P(Zj), P(Z2), P(Z3). These proba-
bilities are calculated by Mr. Justice in the following way.
First, he realizes that based upon his many years of using
the services of Mr. Holmes that if Mr. Trouble is innocent,
Mr. Holmes will report Z, with probability .1 (i.e., P(Zl/9 1)
= .1), Z2 with probability .2 (i.e., P(Z 2 /91 ) = .2), and Z3
with probability .7 (i.e., P(Z3 /91) = .7). He also realizes
that if Mr. Trouble is guilty that Mr. Holmes will report
Zl with probability .8 (i.e., P(Zl/9 2) = .8), Z2 with
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probability .1 (i.e., P(Z2/02 ) = .1), and Z3 with probabil-
ity .1 (i.e., P(Z3 /02) = .1). From these probabilities and
using the equation from Appendix, we have:
P(Zi) = P(Zi/9 1 ) P(9 1 ) + P(Zi/9 2 ) P(9 2 )
(.1) (.5) + (.8) (.5)
P(Zk) = .45
P(Z 2 ) = P(Z 2 /91) P9 1 ) + P(Z 2 /9 2 ) P(9 2 )
(.2) (.5) + (.1) (.5)
P(Z 2 ) = .15
P(Z3) = P(Z 3 /Q1) P(91) + P(Z 3 /9 2 ) P(0 2 )
(.7) (.5) + (.1) (.5)
P(Z 3 ) = .40
These probabilities are entered under the appropriate branches.
Now that Mr. Justice has P(Zi/Qi), P(9i) and P(Zi)
in his arsenal of statistics, he now calculates the a-poster-
iori probabilities from the Baysian relationship:
P (91/Z ) =
(1) P(91/Zl) = P(Zl/91) P(01) = (.1)(.5) = .111
P(Z ) .45
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P(Zi)
(2) P(92/Z 1 ) = P (Z 1 /9 2 ) P(9 2 ) (.8)(.5) = .889
P(Z 1 ) .45
(3) P(9 1 /Z2 ) = P(Z 2 /Q1) P(0 1 ) = (.2)(.5) = .667
P(Z2) .15
(4) P(92 2) = P(Z 2 /@2 ) P(0 2 ) = (.1)(.5) = .333
P(Z2 ) .15
(5) P(9 1 /Z3 ) = P(Z3 /91 ) P ) = (.7)(.5) = .875'
P(Z3 ) .40
(6) P(92/Z 3 ) = P(Z3/9 2 ) P((2 ) = (.1)(.5) = .125
P(Z3) .40
After nature chooses the report, Mr. Justice then chooses be-
tween a1 and a2 such that his expected gain in utility is max-
imum and this expected gain is calculated as above. For ex-
ample, if nature were to choose ZI, then Mr. Justice could
choose a1 and nature could choose 91, with probability
P(91/Z1 ) = .111 and yield a utility of 3, or nature could
choose 92 with probability P(92 /Zl) = .889 and yield a util-
ity of 0. Thus the expected gain in utility to Mr. Justice
for choosing a1 when nature has chosen Zi is (.111) (3) +
(.889)(0) = .333. Similarly, if Mr. Justice had chosen a2
then nature could choose 91 with probability P(91 /Z1 ) = .111
and yield a utility of 1, or nature could choose 92 with
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probability P(92/Z1 ) = .889 and yield a utility of 2. Thus
the expected gain in utility to Mr. Justice for choosing a2
when nature has chosen Zl is (.111)(1) + (.889)(2) = 1.889.
Thus wishing to maximize his utility gain, Mr. Justice would
choose a2 if nature chose Z and he would expect to gain 1.889.
If nature were to choose Z2, then Mr. Justice could choose a1
and nature, in turn, could choose 91, with probability P(91/Z2 )
= .667 and yield a utility of 3, or nature could choose 92 with
probability P(92 /Z2) = .333 and yield a utility of 0. Thus
the expected gain in utility to Mr. Justice for choosing a1
when nature has chosen Z2 is:
(.667)(3) + (.333)(0) = 2.001
Similarly, if Mr. Justice had chosen a2 , then nature could
choose 91 with probability P(91/Z2 ) = .667 and yield a utility
of 1, or nature could choose 92 with probability P(92/Z2 ) = .333
and yield a utility of 2. Thus the expected gain in utility to
Mr. Justice for choosing a2 when nature has chosen Z2 is:
(.667)(1) + (.333)(2) - 1.333
Thus wishing to maximize his utility gain, Mr. Justice would
choose ai if nature chose Z2 and he would expect to gain 2.001.
By analogous calculations, if nature chooses Z3 , then
Mr. Justice will expect a gain in utility of 2.625 if he chooses
a1 , and a gain of 1.125 if he chooses a2. Therefore, to
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maximize his expected gain he will choose a, and expect to
gain 2.625.
So we see that when Mr. Justice chooses to have
Mr. Holmes investigate (e1 ) nature chooses Zi with probabil-
ity P(Zi) = .45, and Mr. Justice can expect to gain 1.889,
or nature chooses Z2 with probability P(Z2) = .15 and Mr.
Justice can expect to gain 2.001 or finally nature chooses
Z3 with probability P(Z3) = .40 and Mr. Justice can expect
to gain 2.625. Thus, the expected gain in utility to Mr.
Justice for having Mr. Holmes investigate is (.45)(1.889) +
(.15)(2.001) + (.40)(2.625) = 2.200. However, Mr. Justice
must pay Mr. Holmes .5 for his results and therefore the net
expected gain in utility due to Mr. Holmes' investigation is
2.200 - .500 = 1.700 and this is entered under branch ei.
This gain in utility of 1.7 due to Mr. Holmes' in-
vestigation is greater than the expected gain in utility
when no investigation is made. Therefore, Mr. Justice would
be very well advised to have Mr. Holmes perform his investi-
gation. In fact, if Mr. Holmes had been a statistical deci-
sion maker, he could have charged up to .7 units of utility
and Mr. Justice would still buy.
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CHAPTER IV.
A Practical Example
This chapter is devoted to testing if the model and
methods utilized in Chapter III to make synthetic legal de-
cisions can be applied to making non-synthetic legal deci-
sions in the analysis of an actual law case. The following
analysis represents several months of interviews with some of
the top legal talents in the Boston area. Together with these
distinguished attorneys, I have discussed many of the facets
to making legal decisions and have tried to isolate these de-
cisions for application of the above-mentioned decision theo-
ry model.
The approach that I found best in this process of
interviewing the legal community was to explain just what
statistical decision theory was, without being over-technical,
to give some very simple applications of the theory to making
very elementary decisions. After this introductory process
was concluded, the attorney delved into his file for fairly
current cases that might be particularly apropos for this in-
vestigation. The reason that I specifically wanted a "fairly
current" case was that most attorneys handle a large number
of cases over a period of time, say a year, and to be able to
answer my query "What were the decisions you had to make in
this case?", the case had to be still alive in his mind.
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Ideally, I selected cases for this thesis in which decisions
were still being made at this writing.
Once an appropriate case had been chosen or, more
precisely, once a particular decision in an appropriate
case had been chosen for investigation, the next question
was, "What were the various alternatives of action available
to you?", and "Under what possible uncertainties in the state
of the world were you laboring under which prevented you from
choosing a particular alternative of action with absolute cer-
tainty?" In terms of Chapter III, I was asking what were
the possible courses of action a. and what were the possible
states of nature 91. Isolating the possible courses of ac-
tion was not as difficult as defining what were the possible
states of nature and in many cases that were brought out of
the attorney's file, it was impossible to define the possible
states of nature.
However, once a case was found, in which a decision
and the various prevailing states of nature under which this
decision had to be made were well defined, I then had to de-
termine from the attorney what were his a-priori feelings as
to the relative likelihoods of each of the possible states of
nature. This was usually a process comparable to pulling
teeth, because most attorneys do not have a specific feel for
what you mean by the "probability of a particular state of
nature" and, therefore, you must be very careful to avoid the
word "probability" and talk about the more familiar things
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such as "from your experience and under the present circum-
stance, what is the percent of the time you would expect the
state of nature to be such and such over a long period of ob-
servation?" Phrasing the query in this way has the effect
of not alienating or confusing the attorney by using terms
which may be conceptually unknown to him and also putting the
question in terms that may be closer to what he was actually
thinking when he was faced with the decision.
Once I successfully reached this far in my analysis,
I tended a sigh of relief, but progress was short-lived how-
ever, since my next query usually dampened the party again.
This was the attorney's utility table. I found that if I
came right out and asked the attorney what was his utility
for taking a particular course of action, and finding that a
particular state of nature was prevailing, that I usually
got a blank stare as a response. This was because the at-
torney invariably interpreted this to mean, what would be
the absolute gain to him if he took a course of action and
the state of nature was such and such. This would be almost
impossible to judge especially if the utility was not meas-
ured in money alone but included such things as speed of
trial, prestige, etc.
However, an absolute number representing these
utilities is not what is needed to make a decision. What
is really needed is a scale usually in the lawyer's own mind,
based on years of experience, which measures the relative value
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of taking a particular course of action say a1 and having
a particular state of nature 9 1, with taking a particular
course of action ai and having a particular state of na-
ture 91. This is many times easier for an attorney to es-
timate than the absolute scale referred to above. So, my
query to determine the utility of the attorney concerning
the decision under investigation was usually this: "Con-
sider all the possible courses of action available to you
and all the possible states of nature. List all the pos-
sible combinations of a course of action with a state of
nature. Then rearrange this list so that the combination
which is the best for you is at the top of the list, and
that combination which is the worst for you is at the bot-
tom of the list. Then assign a number to each combination
such that the number you assign to one combination (of
course of action and state of nature) will reflect how much
better for you this combination is, or how much worse for
you it is than some other combination".
Once these relative utilities have been ascer-
tained along with the statistical experience of the attorney
about the possible states of nature, we were ready to ap-
proach the decision between the various courses of action.
This entailed drawing an elementary tree such as the one
discussed in Chapter I, and depicted in Fig. 1. Also at this
point, I was able to discuss with the attorney the possible
ways in which he might proceed to get more information about
the existing state of nature so that he could increase his
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expected gain in utility by the decision making process.
We then analyzed these possible experiments according to
the theory outlined in Chapter I and put to test in the ex-
ample of Chapter III.
This essentially is the format that the interviews
usually took. Let us now look at the facts of the specific
case now before us. This case concerns an automobile acci-
dent which occurred in the summer of 1961. The attorney
whom I interviewed is handling the case for the plaintiff, a
boy who, in the summer of 1961, was getting ready to enter
his senior year in high school. The year before, this lad
was awarded the Harvard Book award for scholastic achieve-
ment, and although a quiet boy, he partook in many high
school activities and was quite friendly. In short, this
boy has an excellent scholastic and extra-curricular record
thus far in his high school career.
Then in the summer of 1961 this boy was a passen-
ger in an automobile driven by his friend. There were three
boys in this car, and according to witnesses, the boys were
not speeding. Then a woman driving down a cross street,
failed to stop her motor vehicle in time and plowed straight
into the right front door of the boys' car behind which the
plaintiff was sitting as passenger. The plaintiff, as well
as other occupants, was thrown from the car, and the plain-
tiff was in a coma for nineteen days and suffered a frac-
tured pelvis, a fractured jaw and several fractured ribs. In
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addition, he had multiple scull fractures and lacerations
of the brain with brain fluid coming out of one ear and both
nostrils. When he arrived at the hospital the admitting
surgeon did not give him much of a chance to live.
He did live, however, and after much medical treat-
ment he became medically well. However, he was not mentally
well. He suffered a complete change in his personality.
When he finally went back to his senior year in high school,
he could not get along well with anyone. He was completely
withdrawn. He also did very poorly scholastically; in fact,
he flunked several subjects and could not get into any col-
lege to which he applied. He finally got into a second-rate
college only after a year of prep school and is doing only
"C" work there. In short, what promised to be such a good
career has been completely thwarted.
At this point, I asked the attorney what type of
decision did he have to make in this case. He replied that
the most pressing and most basic decision in this case is
whether to build up as large a case as possible for the
plaintiff by having extensive psychiatric testimony and med-
ical testimony as well as the testimony of friends and
teachers who knew this boy both before and after the acci-
dent, and all of whom could testify to the boy's change in
personality. This would require a substantial expenditure
of money. Or, would it be better to rely on the medical
record so far and the case as it now stands and have not
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as big a case, but not expending a lot of money to build it?
Let us then call these two courses of action a1,
build up a big case and a2 , build up a. small case. The for-
mer course of action will cost an estimated $3,000, according
to the attorney. At this point, I tried to determine the
possible states of nature, and I asked the attorney what were
the possible states of the world that would determine which
course of action he would take. He replied that it all de-
pended on whether the defendant has a sufficient amount of
insurance coverage to pay a large judgment if they were to
press for one. If she had only the minimum coverage
($5,000/10,000) and they pressed for a large case, all they
would collect is a few thousand dollars and this would be
expended in building up a big case.
So, for simplicity, let us assume that there are
three possible states of nature, 91 she has only minimum
coverage, 92 she has moderate coverage and 93 she has ade-
quate coverage for any judgment against her. Obviously, I
could have formed many more states of nature, in fact, one
for each possible insurance level of coverage she could have
been carrying. However, for the present illustrative pur-
poses we will use only three states of nature, and be aware
of the possible extension to more.
I asked the attorney if this information about the
defendant's insurance coverage might not be easily obtain-
able. He answered that it could not. That one of his
-41-
partners who is an officer in the council of Boston Insur-
ance Companies could not even obtain this information. At
this point, I tried to ascertain what were the attorney's
feelings as to the relative likelihood of these three states
of nature. He felt that because the defendant was of limi-
ted means, single and owns a modest single dwelling apartment
(less than $10,000) that probably 9l was the state of nature.
However, since the defendant's insurance company has not
notified the attorney that the defendant has only minimum
coverage, the attorney feels he must give some weight to 92-
He feels also that 03 is unlikely. In the light of this, I
suggested the following a-priori probabilities and he agreed.
P(91) = .7; P(9 2 ) = .25; P(9 3 ) = .05
Then I asked the attorney about the net monetary
gain for taking a particular course of action when a particu-
lar state of nature existed. He replied that if he "sued
big" (a1 ) the plaintiff would probably gain $2,000, if the
defendant had minimum coverage (91); would probably gain
$12,000, if the defendant had moderate coverage (92) and
would probably gain $47,000, if the defendant had adequate
coverage (93). On the other hand, if he "sued small" (a2)
the plaintiff would probably gain $5,000, if the defendant
had minimum coverage (91); would probably gain $15,000, if
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the defendant had moderate coverage 92, and would probably
gain $15,000., if the defendant had adequate coverage 93-
These utilities are summarized in Table 2.
Let us now apply the model discussed in Chapter
III and construct a decision tree similar to the tree in Fig.
2. This tree is shown in Fig. 4. The first decision is up
to the lawyer and he will choose between the two courses of
action "sue big" (a 1 ) and "sue small" (a2 ). Then nature takes
her turn in this decision game and she will choose among the
three possible states of nature with a-priori probability:
P(91) = .7; P(9 2 ) = .25 and P(9 3 ) = .05
These are written below the appropriate branch coming from
nature's decision nodes. The utilities are placed at the
end of these branches and represent the net gain of the
plaintiff for choosing the course of action and finding that
state of nature which leads him along that branch.
We can calculate the expected gain in utility for
each course of action as we did in Chapter III. If the at-
torney chooses to "sue big" (a1 ), then nature may choose 91
with probability = .7 and the gain = $2,000., or nature may
choose 92 with probability = .25 and the gain = $12,000.,or
nature may choose 93 with probability = .05 and the gain
=$47,000. Thus the expected gain in utility for "suing big"
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TABLE
a1 P91)
$2,000 $5,000 .7
92 $12,000 $15,000 .25
9 $47,000 $15,000 .05
U(9 ,a)
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.05
$6,750
is .7 ($2,000.) + .25 ($12,000.) + .05 ($47,000.) = $1,400.
+ $3,000. + $2,350. = $6,750. However, if the attorney
chooses to "sue small" (a2), then nature may choose 0 1 with
probability - .7, and the gain = $5,000; or nature may
choose 92 with probability = .25 and the gain = $15,000.;
or nature may choose 03 with probability = .05 and the gain
= $15,000. Thus the expected gain in utility for "suing
small" is:
.7($5,000.) + .25 ($15,000.) + .05 ($15,000)
= $3,500. + $3,750. + $750. = $8,000.
Therefore, with these a-priori probabilities, the attorney
would be well advised to "sue small" (i.e., take course of
action a2) in order that he maximize his expected gain in
utility. In this case, he now can expect to gain $8,000
by suing small.
Let us now calculate the value of information,
which would tell him the exact state of nature. We call the
difference between this expected gain in utility before ex-
act knowledge and after the expected value of perfect infor-
mation, E.V.P.I. It is the value of knowing of the exact
state of nature and, as such, represents the maximum amount
one should pay for any information which would let you know
something about the exact state of nature. If the attorney
was told what the exact state of nature is, he would be
-46-
told that it is 91 with probability P(91 ) = .7, and he
would take action a2 and gain $5,000; or, he would be told
that it is 92 with probability P(92 ) = .25 and he would
take action a2 and gain $15,000, or he would be told that
it is 93 with probability P(9 3 ) = .05 and he would choose
action a1 and gain $47,000. Thus his expected gain in util-
ity for perfect information is:
.7 ($5,000) + .25 ($15,000) + .05 ($47,000)
= $3,500. + $3,750. + $2,350. = $9,600.
However, before he had exact knowledge he could
expect to gain $8,000. by taking action a2 . Therefore, the
E.V.P.I. is $9,600 - $8,000 = $1,600.
One of the beauties of this model is that it can
be used as in Chapter III to analyze the worth of any exper-
iment; that is, suggest to give more information as to the
exact state of nature. Let us now analyze the following ex-
periment suggested by me to the attorney. I suggested that
he hire an insurance investigator to investigate the defend-
ant's financial status and then investigate insurance com-
pany statistics and to report back one of three results,
Z1 , the defendant probably carries low insurance; Z2, the
defendant probably carries moderate insurance, or Z3 , the
defendant probably carries high insurance.
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What is now needed is some statistical information
on such things as how often the investigator will report
that the person he is investigating has low insurance when
he actually has moderate or high insurance. This can only
be gotten from experience, and since this attorney has nev-
er tried this experiment before, we must merely guess at
these statistics. In other words, we will assume that if
the defendant actually has low insurance that the investiga-
tor will report that she has low insurance 80% of the time,
and he will report that she has moderate insurance 15% of
the time, and he will report she has high insurance 5% of
the time. If, however, the defendant actually had moderate
insurance coverage, the investigator will report that she
has low insurance 20% of the time, and he will report that
she has moderate insurance 70% of the time, and he will re-
port that she has high insurance 10% of the time. If the
defendant actually had high insurance coverage, the inves-
tigator will report that she has low insurance 10% of the
time, that she has moderate insurance 20% of the time, and
that she has high insurance 70% of the time. These statis-
tics on the investigator's reliability are summarized in
Table 3. Let us now calculate the probabilities that na-
ture will choose the outcomes of this experiment. From the
Appendix, we have:
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TABLE 3
z2 z3
91 .7 .25 .05
.2 .7 .1
92
93 .1.2 .7
KY
P(Z./9.)
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P(Zi) = P(Zl/9 1 ) P(9 1 ) + P(Zl/9 2 ) P(92) + P(Z 1 /9 3 ) P(9 3 )
= (.7) (.7) + (.2) (.25) + (.1) (.05)
P(Z1) = .545
P(Z 2 ) = P(Z 2 /9 1 ) P 1 ) + P(Z 2 /9 2 ) P(9 2 ) + P(Z 2 /9 3 ) P(9 3 )
(.25) (.7) + (.7) (.25) + (.2) (.05)
P(Z2) = .360
P(Z3) = P(Z3 /91 ) P(Ol) + P(Z3 /9 2 ) P(9 2 ) + P(Z3 /93 ) P(9 3 )
= (.05) (.7) + (.1) (.25) + (.7) (.05)
P(Z3) = .095
Now, as we did in Chapter III, we can calculate the
a-posteriori probabilities from Bayes' rule:
P(91/Zj) =
P(zj/)il- PODi
P (Zg )
i = 1,2,3
j = 1,2,3
So:
(1) P(9 1 /Zi)
(2) P(9 2 /Zl)
P(Zl/9 1 ) P(Ql) ( .7) (7)
P(Zl) .545 .899
P(z 1 /9 2 ) P(9 2 ) (.2) (.25) .092
-- p(g1) = .545 .9
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P(93/ 1 =
P(Z1/93) P(93 )
P(Zl)
P(Z2/01) P(91 )
P P(Z 2 )
P(Z2/Q2) P(92 )
P(92/Z2) = P(Z2)
P(93/Z2=
P(91/Z3)
P(92/Z3)
P(Z2/93) P(@3 )
P(Z2 )
P(Z3/Q1) P(Q1 )
P(Z3 )
P(Z 3 /9 2 ) P(9 2 )
P(Z3)
(.1) (.05)
.545
(.25) (.7)
.360 =
(.7) (.25)
.360 =
(.2) (.05)
.360
(.05) (.7)
.095
(.1) (.25)
.095
= .009
.486
.486
= .028
= .368
= .264
P(Z3 / 3 ) P(03) (.7) (.05)
(9) P(93/Z3 ) = P(Z 3 ) = .095 = .368
Now we are ready to analyze the decision tree depic-
ted in Fig. 5. The attorney's initial choice is whether to
experiment (el) or not to experiment (e0 ). If he chooses not
to experiment he is back to the tree in Fig. 4 and he chooses
action a2 and expects to gain $8,000. for his client. If, on
the other hand, he chooses to experimentnature then chooses
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one of three possible outcomes with probabilities P(Z.) i =
1, 2, 3. Then it is the attorney's turn to go and he chooses
either al or a2 depending on which course of action will max-
imize his expected gain in utilities. Finally, nature picks
one of three possible states of nature with the a-posteriori
probabilities P(9i/Zj) calculated above (these are placed un-
der the appropriate branches in our tree), and gives the law-
yer the utility marked at the end of these branches.
So, let us now proceed to evaluate the experiment
by calculating the expected gain in utility if the attorney
chooses e1 . Consider when nature chooses Z, as the outcome
of the investigation. If the attorney chooses a1 then nature
could choose 91 with probability P(91 /Z1 ) = .899 and yield a
gain of $2,000., or choose 92 with probability P(92/Zl) = .092
and yield a gain of $12,,00, or choose 93 with a probability
P(93Zl) = .009 and yield a gain of $47,000. Thus the expec-
ted gain for the attorney if he chooses a1 when nature chooses
Zl is:
(.899)($2,000) + (.09Z($12,000) = (.009)($47,000) = $3,329
If the attorney chooses a2 when nature chooses Zi
then nature could choose 91 with probability P(91/Z1 ) = .899
and yield $5,000 or she could choose 92 with probability
P(92/Z2) = .92 and yield $15,000, or she could choose 93 with
probability P(93/Z1 ) = .009 and yield $15,000. Thus, if the
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attorney chooses a2 when nature chooses Z1 then his expected
gain in utility is:
(.899)($5,000) + (.092)($15,000) + (.009)($15,000) = $6,010.
Therefore, wishing to maximize his expected gain in
utility, the attorney is advised to choose a.2 if the investi-
gator reports Z1 , and his expected gain in utility would be
$6,010.
Assume now that nature chooses Z2 as the outcome of
the experiment. If the attorney chooses a1 then nature could
choose 91 with probability P(91 /Z2 ) = .486 and yield $ 2,000,or
choose 92 with probability P(92/Z2 ) = .486 and yield $12,000,or
choose 93 with probability P(93/Z2 ) = .028 and yield $47,000.
Thus, the expected gain for the attorney if he chooses ai when
nature chooses Z2 is:
(.486)($2000) + (486)($12000) + (.028)($47,000) = $8,120.
If the attorney chooses a2 then nature could choose
91 with probability P(91 /Z2) = .486 and yield $5,000 or she
could choose 92 with probability P(92 /Z2) = .486 and yield
$15,000, or choose 93 with probability P(93 /Z2) = .028 and
yield $15,000. Thus if the attorney chooses a2 when nature
chooses Z2 he can expect a gain in utility of:
(.466)($5000) + (.486)($15000) + (.028)($15000) = $10,140.
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Therefore, wishing to maximize his expected util-
ity, the attorney is well advised to choose a2 if the out-
come of the investigation is Z2 , and thus expect to gain
$10,140.
Finally, now assume that nature picked Z3 as the
outcome of the investigation. If the attorney chooses a1 ,
then nature could choose 91 with probability P(91/Z3 ) = .368
and yield $2,000, or she could choose 92 with probability
P(92 /Z3 ) = .264 and yield $12,000, or she could choose 93
with probability P(93 /Z3 ) = .368 and yield $47,000. Thus,
if the attorney chooses a, when nature chooses Z3 he can ex-
pect a gain in utility of:
(.368)($2000) + (.264)($12,000) +(.368)($47000) = $20,832
If the attorney chooses a2 then nature could choose
91 with probability P(91 /Z3 ) = .368 and yield a gain of $5000.
or she could choose 92 with probability P(92/Z3 ) = .264 and
yield $15,000, or she could pick 93 with probability P(93 /Z3 )
= .368 and yield $15,000. Thus if the attorney chooses a2
when nature chooses Z3 , he can expect a gain in utility of:
(.368)($5000) + (.264)($15000) + (.368)($15000) = $11,320
In this case, when nature chooses Z3 as the outcome
of the investigation, the attorney still wishing to maximize
his expected gain in utility will chose a1 and expect a gain
of $20,832.
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Now we can evaluate the expected gain in utility
to the attorney when he chooses to experiment. Nature may
choose Z, as the outcome with probability P(Zi) = .545, and
the attorney chooses a2 and expects a gain in utility of
$6,010., or nature may choose Z2 with probability P(Z2) =
.360, and the attorney chooses a2 and expects a gain in
utility of $10,140, or finally, nature may choose Z3 as the
outcome with probability P(Z3 ) = .095 and the attorney now
chooses a. and expects a gain in utility of $20,832. There-
fore, the expected gain in utility to the attorney for
choosing the investigation is:
(.545)($6010) + (.360)($10140) + (.095)($20832) = $8,904.89
However, from this amount we must subtract the cost
of the investigation. This brings up the sticky question of
how much are we willing to pay the insurance investigator for
carrying out his investigation? Obviously, we will not pay
so much that when this amount subtracted from $8,904.89
leaves an amount less than the $8,000. we expect to receive
without the investigation.
Therefore, the maximum the attorney should be wil-
ling to pay for an investigation of this type is $904.89. If
the bill is any higher it would not pay to have this investi-
gation.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER SUGGESTIONS
In Chapter I we looked at the statistical decision
theory formalism and we saw that we approached the decision
making process by dividing the problem into segments and de-
fining sample spaces from each segment of the decision to be
made. For example, one segment of the problem that we isola-
ted in such a way was the alternatives that we could take to
reach our predefined goal; i.e., the alternatives that are
ultimately the object of our decisions. This was not actually
a true sample space because no probability measure was de-
fined on it. This is because we follow the convention that
we assign probability measure only to those segments which
are ultimately decided by nature.
An example of this latter type of segment of the
problem that we isolated was the states of nature. Here we
could define a probability measure because the decision maker
was not making this decision but only predicting it, and the
probability measure is representative of his predictions.
In Chapter II we discussed some of the problems
involved in applying the theory of Chapter I to the real life
world of the legal decision maker.
Chapter III was a hypothetical law case in which
the legal decision maker applied the theory of Chapter I in
a systematic method of statistical investigation and applica-
tion and further calculating the worth of the acquisition of
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additional information through experimentation. This system-
atic application of the theory was the model upon which actual
law cases were analyzed and finally one was picked for illus-
tration in Chapter IV. This case was analyzed within the con-
fines of Chapter III and a suggestion for gaining further in-
formation was evaluated also within the systematic method of
our model.
One conclusion I can draw from the above analysis
is that although the model may be good for certain legal de-
cision it cannot be extended to include all the possible de-
cisions in the conduct of a law case. There are too many im-
ponderables and before an entire law case can be decided using
this model, better means must be found for categorizing the
possible courses of action or the possible states of nature.
Another conclusion that I have reached is that for
most legal decisions the states of nature can be best des-
cribed in a model which has a continuous distribution of
states of nature. The solution here is a simple extension
from discrete to continuous, where the discrete probability
measure is replaced by a density function and the expected
utility is an integral. The "goal" of maximizing this util-
ity integral will involve the application of variational
calculus.
Thus I feel that with the use of continuous dis-
tribution of states of nature, continuous density function,
and utilities which are functions of the continuous variable
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9 and also the use of variational calculus,the extension may
be made from the model of this thesis to more complete anal-
ysis of legal decisions.
A further conclusion that I have arrived at is the
need for criteria for choosing experiments to be analyzed.
Some experiments of course are more vaiuable to perform than
others.
In light of the above conclusion, I would suggest
further work in the above-mentioned extension of the present
model to include a larger number of legal decisions.
There is a need to investigate the various utili-
ties that may occur in the same law case. These utilities
will include money, prestige, etc., and a criteria for cor-
relation of these various utilities are needed if they are
pertinent to the same decision in a case of if several deci-
sions are to be cascaded in a case. In other words, there
should be some attempt at putting utilities on a common scale.
Finally, I would like to add a personal observation
in the conduct of the present investigation. This thesis is
intended to apply the theory of making statistical decisions
to making legal decisions. If the procedure becomes so com-
plex technically that no attorney would be equipped to apply
it, what is its value? In addition, it is the practice now
of the legal community, when analyzing the use of an investi-
gator as we did statistically in Chapters III and IV, not to
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really question the price. They simply take the bill of
the investigator and add it on to the bill of their client
with no analysis. I wonder if the development of the pres-
ent theory will change this practice.
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APPENDIX
Appropriate Probability Theory
This appendix is devoted to the presentation of
the probability theory which was used in the development of
this thesis. In our discussion of statistical decision, we
have employed the main role played by the concept of "ran-
domness". If the decision maker knew in advance the exact
state of nature, there would be no need to apply the concepts
of this thesis.
"Randomness" may arise because of the inherent ran-
domness of the process such as is the case in coin tossing,
or randomness may arise in a process so complex that it is
beyond our ability to ascertain detail. When a process ex-
hibits randomness we talk about its average qualities instead
of its exact qualities. Let us now proceed with the present-
ation of the mathematical tools called the theory of probabil-
ity with the following definitions.
Sample Space: is any kind of a collection. Each
object of the collection is represented by a sample point
in this sample space. The sample space is denoted byj .
Event: is a group of all sample points (objects
of the collection) in the sample space which share a common
identifiable attribute. These events are labeled by capital
letters A, B, C.... .
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Probability Measure: is an assignment of real num-
bers to the events defined in the sample space. The probabil-
ity of an event is denoted by P(A), and 0, P(A) (1.
The definition of a sample space IL and events such
as A, B, ... implies the existence of certain other identifi-
able sets of points we are led to the following definitions.
a. The complement of A, denoted Ac, is the
event containing all points in -2 but
not in A.
Ac = ( : W not in A)
b. The union of A and B, denoted AUB, is
the event containing all points in
either A or B or both.
AUB = (W: W in A or B or both)
c. The intersection of A and B, denoted
AB, is the event containing all points
in both A and B
AB = ( w : W in both A and B)
d. The event containing no sample points
at all is called the null event, deno-
ted 0.
e. Two events A and B are called disjoint
if they contain no common point, i.e.,
if AB = 0.
Since our objective is to use probability theory to
preduct the results of real-world random experiments, it is
reasonable that similar constraints should be imposed upon
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corresponding entities in our mathematical model. We there-
fore restrict our assignment of probability measure to have
the following properties.
I. For every event A., 0 $ Pr(A.) < 1
II. Pr(Q) = 1
III. If AB = 0, Pr(AUB) = Pr(A) + Pr(B)
We define the conditional probability, Pr(A/B), of
an event A given an event B as
Pr(A/B) = Pr(B)
Pr(B)
(1)
whenever Pr(B) # 0. When Pr(A) is also non-zero, it follows
that
Pr(AB) = Pr(A/B)Pr(B) = Pr(B/A)Pr(A) (2)
Clearly, since the intersection of B with itself is B,
Pr(B/B) = 1 (3)
Conditional probabilities serve to narrow considera-
tion to a subspace B of a sample spaceLl. This is easily
visualized pictorially. It is useful to think of "condition-
ing" as a means of generating a new probability system from
a given one.
The new sample space, sayf[[', is the original
event B.
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The new events, say Ai', are the original inter-
sections AiB.
The new probabilities, Pr(Ai'), are the condi-
tional probabilities Pr(Ai/B).
We see as follows that the probabilities Pr(Ai')
satisfy the required Properties I-III. Since Pr(AiB) 6 Pr(B),
Pr(Ai') < 1. Also, Pr(Jl') = 1 by Equation (3). (Division
by Pr(B) in Equation (1) provides the necessary normaliza-
tion.) Finally, when AiAj = 0, Property III follows from the
equalities
Pr(AiUAj/B) =
Pr (AiUA1)B Pr(AiBUA-B)
Pr(B) = (Pr(B)
= Pr(AiB) + Pr(AjB) = Pr(Ai/B) + Pr(A /B)
Pr(B) +
Since conditional probabilities can be considered
as ordinary probabilities on a new sample space, all state-
ments and theorems about ordinary probabilities also hold true
for conditional probabilities. In particular, if the set of
intersections (AiB) are a disjoint partitioning of B then
Pr(B) = 2 Pr(AiB)
all i
(4)SPr(B)Pr(Ai/B)
all i
(1)
1 = ~Pr(Ai/B)
all i
(1) 6.311 Notes by Jacobs & Wozencraft, 1963.
(5)
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and
To sum up this appendix on appropriate probability
theory let us consider the following application.
I have a bowl with 10 white and 6 black marbles in
it. I am going to reach in and draw a second marble at ran-
dom. The question is what is the probability that I will
draw one white marble and one black marble. This can happen
in two mutually exclusive ways; i.e., I can draw a white mar-
ble on the first draw and a black marble on the second draw,
or I can draw a black marble on the first draw and a white
marble on the second draw. Therefore:
P (drawing one white and one black marble) =
P ([white on 1st draw3 [black on 2nd draw3)+
P (black on 1st draws [white on 2nd drawj)
By equation (2) above, we have:
P ((white on 1st drawS [black on 2nd drawj)=
P ({black on 2nd drawj/[white on 1st draw3) P (white on
1st draw)
6 10
= (T5) (1) = ,25
also
P ([black on 1st drawl [white on 2nd drawj)
PQwhite on 2nd draw3/[black on 1st drawj) P (black on 1st draw )
10 6 ) 25I T 1 =.2
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therefore,
P (drawing one white and one black marble) =
(.25) + (.25) = .50
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